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1. INTRODUCTION 
When we think of the <"founding" of the ADR movement (particularly, but 
not exclusively, in law), from when do we date it? Whom do we think of as our 
leaders? Many of us think of Frank Sander and the "multi-door courthouse" 
suggested by his famous paper, delivered at the Pound Conference on the Causes 
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice in 1976.1 For 
others, the publication of Roger Fisher and William Ury's Getting to Yes,2 
signaled an interest in a changed paradigm for engaging in legal negotiations.3 
Some may associate ADR's nascency with early practical efforts to 
institutionalize "warmer"4 methods of disputing. Calling on these methods, the 
* Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution at The Ohio State University College of Law, 
delivered April 13, 2000. 
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Chair, Georgetown-CPR 
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR. Thanks to Josh Stulberg, Nancy Rogers, the 
editors of The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, and The Ohio State College of Law 
ADR programs for their invitation and on-going work and excellence in our field. Special 
thanks to my superb research assistant, Meredith Weinberg. 
1 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the 
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 111, 111 (1976). 
2 ROOERFIsHER & WIlliAM URY, GETIING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WmrOUT 
GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed. 2d ed., 1991). 
3 Of course, I like to think my own article on legal negotiation played some role in the 
increased interest in studying and teaching negotiation. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward 
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 
754 (1984). 
4 David Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J. 
COMPo L. 205 (Supp. 1978). 
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civil rights movement, the consumer movement, and local empowerment efforts5 
all attempted to increase community participation and involvement in issues that 
were linked to larger social concerns. Yet, as we date most of the modern "ADR 
movement"6 to the 1970s and 1980s, we may be failing to pay enough serious 
attention to earlier "intellectual" founders of ADR-those who provided the key 
ideas, concepts or organizing frameworks7 from which we have built our modern 
movement of theories, practices, policies, and institutions. In this essay, I hope 
to remind us of who went before, and which of their ideas helped generate our 
current understandings of our field. I also will examine which of these ideas, 
theories, and concepts continue robustly to influence our practices and which 
might need to be modified in light of current conditions. 
I will explicate some of the key concepts that form the cornerstone of our 
conceptions of "appropriate dispute resolution" and trace them to their 
intellectual sources. I do this because I think it is important to elaborate a 
"jurisprudence of ADR," both to justify and explain the special "morality" and 
"logic" of different processes of dispute resolution and to prepare us better to 
defend what we are trying to accomplish against continuing critiques of what is 
often perceived as a less ')ust" way of resolving disputes and settling cases.8 The 
5 E.g., THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY 
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (Sally E. Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993) (describing 
the San Francisco Community Boards, which opened in 1976, as "one of the most prominent 
examples of a form of community mediation deeply rooted in community life"); Ray 
Schon holtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure and Guiding Principles, 5 
MEDIATION Q. 3 (1984). 
6 Both terms are problematic: "ADR" because it usually connotes "alternative" dispute 
resolution, but is increasingly called "appropriate" dispute resolution, to reflect the fact that 
most disputes and cases are dealt with outside of trial, so that full-scale litigation, in the form 
of trial, is really the alternative. Albie Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the 
Old-Fashioned Way-We Earn It!, 4 NEGOT. J. 55, 62 (1988) (renaming "ADR" as 
"appropriate" dispute resolution). As for "movement," many of us think of ourselves as 
participating in a "social movement" designed to alter both the processes of conflict 
management or handling and the kinds of outcomes produced. The social movement aspects 
of some of the teachings of the founders of ADR, however, have been transformed into 
caseload reduction and efficiency policy mandates that have tended to bureaucratize and 
pacify the more socially transformative aspects of the political movement. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or 
the "Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991). 
7 In this essay, I am primarily interested in our more recent "intellectual" history, as 
contrasted to the much longer history of ADR practices. E.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE 
WITHOUT LAW? (1983); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When 
Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1613 (1997). 
8 E.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984); David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. LJ. 2619 (1995); Carrie Menkel-
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relation of dispute processes to the larger project of exp!icating a theory of law 
in jurisprudential tenns remains to be completed.9 Ours has been an eclectic field 
intellectually, and we have used, borrowed, and elaborated on ideas that have 
come to us from many different fields, not only from law and legal theory, but 
from anthropology, sociology, international relations, soC;hll and cognitive 
psychology, game theory and economics, and most recently, political theory. 
Like any new field, we can ask if we have an intellectual core or canon of our 
own, whether we need one, or whether we are, in fact, stronger or more robust 
because we do straddle so many different fields. As one who believes deeply in 
multi-disciplinary study and multi-causal explanations of social behavior, I think 
our field of "ADR" or conflict resolution is richer for its mUltiple sources of 
insights and sensitivity to the interactive effects of law and legal institutions with 
other social institutions. If our field's purpose is to provide fair, just, and more 
harmonious solutions to human problems, then we will not easily be cabined to 
teachings from law and legal theory alone. 
The key concepts (and their intellectual elaborators10) that inform our efforts 
to create more flexible and varied processes for dispute handlingll and more 
Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of 
Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. LJ. 2663 (1995). In one sense, Plato may have 
articulated one version of ADR jurisprudence. In discussing first, second, and third best 
judges, he suggests that the judge who can reconcile divided parties to each other (albeit 
through law) may be the best judge of all (better than those who "rule"): 
Which Gudgel would be better: the one who destroyed the wicked among them and set 
the better to ruling themselves, or the one who made the worthy men-rule and allowed 
the worse to live while making them willing to be ruled? But I suppose we should also 
mention the judge who is third in respect to virtue-if there should ever be such a 
judge-one capable of taking over a single divided family and destroying no one, but 
rather reconciling them by laying down laws for the,m for the rest of time and thus 
securing their friendship for one another. , 
PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 6 (Thomas L. Pangle ed. & trans., Basic Books 1980); DAVID 
LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 322-23 (1994). 
9 For examples of some recent efforts, see STUART HAMP~HIRE, JUSTICE IS CONfLICI' 
(2000); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, INTRODUCI'lON, MEDIATION: THEORY, PRACI'lCE AND 
POLICY (forthcoming 2001). This is one of the deep jurisprudential issues that Lon Fuller 
sought to address in his series of essays on process discussed infra Part IV. One could ask, 
for example, what is the theory of law that includes variations of process for its 
development, interpretation, and implementation? Or, does the process of dispute resolution 
require theorizing outside of law and legal institutions, belonging instead to the political 
philosophy and sociology of conflict? 
10 I am selecting a few representative intellectual founders of each concept. In many 
instances, there are several theorists or researchers that have informed the development of 
an idea or a cluster of concepts which have influenced the "theory" of ADR. 
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tailored, just or efficient solutions to problems include "the nature and function 
of conflict" that we learn from Georg Simmel,12 Lewis Coser,13 Morton 
Deutsch,14 and Mary Parker FollettI5 via sociology, social psychology, social 
work, business and public administration. Also encompassed in a broader view 
of conflict are "the social and cultural contexts of disputing," as elaborated by 
Laura Nader and other anthropologists and socia-legal scholars.16 The functional 
and moral variations of different dispute processes are developed by Lon 
Fuller,17whom I have dubbed the "jurisprude of ADR,"18 and Soia 
Mentschikoff. 19 Differences in the "quality of outcomes" produced by different 
processes have been studied and theorized by Vilfredo Pareto,20 George 
Homans,21 and more recently, Robert Axelrod.22 The social psychology of 
strategic processes and decision making are explored by game theorists and 
11 I prefer this term to "dispute or conflict management or resolution," which assume 
that the disputes and conflicts will be finally put down or ended, when, in reality, conflict 
may continue in a different form or may be "productive" in some way so that it should not 
be squelched. 
12 GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT (Kurt H. Wolff et al. trans., 1955). 
13 LEWIS COSER, THE FuNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1964). 
14 MORTON DEUTSCH, THE REsOLUTION OF CONfllCT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE 
PROCESSES (1973); CONFLICT, COOPERATION AND JUSTICE: EsSAYS INsPIRED BY THE WORK 
OF MORTON DEUTSCH (Barbara Benedict Bunker et al. eds., 1995); THE HANDBOOK OF 
CONFLICT REsOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Morton Deutsch & Peter Coleman eds., 
2000). 
15 MARy PARKER FOLLETT, PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS 
FROM THE 1920s (pauline Graham ed., 1996). 
16 E.g., THE DISPUTING PROCESs-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry Todd 
eds., 1978); P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURALPERsPECTIVE 
(1979); KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE AND CONFLICT REsOLUTION (1998); Richard Abel, A 
Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & SOC'y REv. 217 (1973). 
17 LoN L. FuLLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth 1. Winston ed., 1981). 
18 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No 
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 
407,449 (1997). 
19 Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 699 
(1952); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961). 
20 E.g., VILFREDOPARETO: SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS (S.E. Finer ed., 1966). 
21 GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 
(1961) (teaching the important lesson that human beings often have complementary, not 
competing needs, and can therefore achieve "trades" that make both parties better off, 
following trades and negotiations, than they would be without such interactions). 
22 ROBERTM. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); see also ROBERT 
M. AxELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION 
AND COLLABORATION (1997). 
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decision scientists, like Howard Raiffa23 and social and cognitive 
psychologists.24 The structure of and effectiveness of institutionalization of 
different processes was initially described by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks25 and 
the "legal process" theorists of the 1950s and now informs ,tpe, work of a n~mber 
of scholars, focused on a "new" legal process26 approach to dispute resolution 
and problem solving, including modem democratic discourse theorists (Jurgen 
Habermas,27 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson28) and the~ application to a 
variety of new dispute resolution processes.29 My purposes in briefly reviewing 
the major intellectual contributions of this widely diverse and somewhat arbitrary 
group of social theorists and empiricists to our field is to illuniinate where we 
have come from so we can both understand and remem~er our philosophical 
roots and so we can extend their theories and examine their applicability to 
today's concerns about fair and just treatments of disputes and conflicts, at 
individual, group, nation-state, and international levels. 
23 HOWARD RAlFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); JOHN HAMMOND 
ET AL., SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETfER DECISIONS (1998). 
24 E.g., DANIELKAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES (1982); RiCHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). 
25 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND Al'PUCATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
26 I am going to distinguish here "new legal process" in the institutionalization of 
dispute processes and their jUstification from what Ed Rubin has tried to claim as a "new 
legal process" school in the empirical study and conceptualization of the "new micro-
institutionalism" of legal institutions. See e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, 
The Synthesis o/Discourse and the Microanalysis o/Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1393 
(1996); see also Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology o/Law, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 521 
(1997). 
27 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FAcrs AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992). 
28 AMy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); 
DEUBERATIVEPOUTICS: EsSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen Macedo ed., 
1999); JAMES BOHMAN, PUBUC DEUBERATION: PLURAUSM, COMPlEXITY. AND DEMOCRACY 
(1996); MARK KINGWEll, A CIVIL TONGUE: JUSTICE, DIALOGUE AND THE POUTICS OF 
PLURAUSM (1995). 
29 E.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING 
AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999); A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONSENSUS (Jim 
Arthur et al. eds., 1999); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADow, The Limits 0/ Adversarial Ethics, in 
ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Deborah Rhode ed., 2000); Innovations in Process: New Applications 
inADR, DISP. RESoL. MAG., Summer 1998, at 4-27. 
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II. THE SOCIAL FuNCTION OF CONFLICT: CONSlRUCTIVE AND 
CREATIVE CONFLICT 
In the law, we tend to call our field "dispute resolution," which connotes its 
origins in cases and disputes30 or "trouble cases," as the legal anthropologists call 
it. In fact, dispute resolution is situated in a broader intellectual space of the 
sociology or philosophy of the role of conflict.31 While many in the ADR field 
think of conflict as a problematic aspect of human life, requiring "resolution" or 
"management," many social theorists prefer to see conflict as variable: 
sometimes "destructive," but sometimes "constructive" or even creative, ever an 
opportunity for learning and growth. The sociologists Georg Simmel and Lewis 
Coser argued that conflict can be a very positive social force that prevents 
stagnation, stimulates curiosity and learning, "airing" of problems, and the search 
for new solutions at both individual and social levels. Conflict can help forge 
identity and cohesiveness (especially when threatened from without) and can 
help identify what is really important. Working with both individual and social 
conflicts helps articulate and test what norms and rules should be applied to 
situations32 and successful "negotiation" through conflict makes both individuals 
and groups stronger by demonstrating survival and flexibility skills and 
permitting continuity. Building on this work, which treats conflict not as a 
"negative" but as a "variable," social psychologist Morton Deutsch, among 
30 William L.F. Felstiner et aI., The Emergence and Transfonnation of Disputes: 
Naming, Blaming and Claiming . .. , 15 LAW & SOCYREV. 631 (1980-81) (describing the 
social construction of dispute occurrences, recognition, definitions, attributions, and 
variations in claiming behavior). 
31 For a recent and eloquent statement of the importance of conflict in any 
philosophically just society, see generally HAMPSHIRE, supra note 9, suggesting that 
substantive conflict can never be eliminated in a diverse society. Hampshire argues that what 
we can agree about is procedural fairness in the treatment of conflicts, where the "two" sides 
to any conflict are granted a fair hearing and procedures are sufficiently acceptable to those 
to whom they are meant to apply. I agree with much of Hampshire's statements about the 
relation of conflict to justice, except that, in my view, conflicts are not only two-sided. He 
seems to import an unquestioned acceptance of the Anglo-American adversary system as an 
ideal form of procedural fairness. For my critique of these assumptions, see Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodem, Multicultural World, 38 
WM. & MARy L. REv. 5 (1996) (suggesting that modern disputes have multiple issues and 
multiple parties and are not simply "two-sided"). 
32 Remember that in one of the first law review articles on negotiation, Melvin 
Eisenberg argued that even transactional negotiations were norm-creating, just as much as 
litigation-based dispute negotiations were. See generally Melvin Eisenberg, Private 
Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637 
(1976). 
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others, has developed a taxonomy of different kinds of conflicts, allowing us to 
see that with variability of structure and function, there can also be variability of 
approaches to conflict handling. Social psychological models of conflict 
categorize on the basis of type of dispute33 and on the perceptions or relations of 
the parties (i.e., do the parties see things the same way or differently, are there 
multiple parties, other constituents, is there an on-going relation, is the conflict 
manifest or latent, direct or misattributed}.34 
Even before these discussions of the social function of conflict, Mary Parker 
Follett, one of the leading "mothers,"35 of invention in ADR talked about 
"constructive conflict" in the context of organizational and labor disputes. 
Serving as the inspiration for many early practitioners of recent ADR,36 Mary 
Parker Follett trained as a political scientist, then used her knowledge fIrst in 
social work and then in organizational management and international affairs. She 
lectured frequently in personnel management contexts and was interested in how 
groups, using principles of democratic governance, could work together and 
produce better outcomes than hierarchically produced orders. Participation, 
constructive conflict, creativity, circular responses, and integrative behavior-the 
principles to which Follett devoted her life-are the touchstones of much of what 
we teach and hope to accomplish in good dispute resolution environments. 
Follett often spoke enthusiastically about the functions of conflict, and in one of 
my favorite passages, she says: 
As conflict-difference-is here in the world, as we cannot avoid it, we 
should, I think use it Instead of condemning it, we should set it to work for us. 
Why not? What does the mechanical engineer do with friction? Of course, his 
chief job is to eliminate friction, but it is true that he also capitalizes friction. 
The transmission of power by belts depends on friction between the belt and 
33 What I have called the "res" of the dispute is a thing, a feeling or understanding, a 
relationship, a value conflict Must the "res" or thing be divided (is it a scarce resource) or 
can it be shared in some way? Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of 
Strategies in Search ofa Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 905, 927. 
34 DEUTSCH, supra note 14, at 11-17. 
35 For some of us, it is heartening to discover that the idea of "integrative" solutions to 
situations of conflict, in fact, originated with a woman. As in many other fields of endeavor, 
some of the "fathers" got the credit they might not have wholly deserved. For instance, in 
their classic book on labor-management negotiations, Richard Walton and Robert McKersie 
discussed and cited Follett's work, but they seem to have walked off with the credit for the 
idea. See generally RICHARD WALTON & ROBERT McKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF 
LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965); Deborah Kolb, The Lovefor Three Oranges Or: What Did We 
Miss About Ms. Follett in the Library?, 11 NEG. J. 339 (1995). 
36 Albie M. Davis, An Interview with Mary Parker Follett, 5 NEGOT. J. 223 (1989). 
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the pulley .... The music of the violin we get by friction .... We talk of the 
friction of mind on mind as a good thing. So in business too, we have to know 
when to try to eliminate friction and when to try to capitalize it, when to see 
what work we can make it do. That is what I wish to consider here, whether we 
can set conflict to work and make it do something for US.37 
For Follett, there were three ways conflict was dealt with: domination, 
compromise, or integration. She urged integration as a process where new 
solutions would emerge from parties trying to meet their desires without the 
compromise of having to give up something.38 It is her story we often tell when 
we describe integrative solutions, when she was one of two readers in a library, 
arguing about an open window. She wanted the window closed because of a 
draft; the other patron wanted fresh air; the solution was to open a window in 
another room for indirect air to circulate.39 In her view, the likelihood of 
integrative solutions, in which parties do not necessarily have to give anything 
up, are increased by bringing differences out into the open, facing the conflicts 
and underlying desires, evaluating and re-valuing desires and preferences when 
the other parties' desires are made known, and looking for solutions in which the 
"interests may fit into each other."40 Follett was undoubtedly an optimistic 
person believing that such mutual interests could be found, but she also thought 
that by uncovering real interests we would be able to distinguish "the significant" 
from "the dramatic" (perhaps another way of understanding the notion of looking 
to the interests behind the positions). She urged a series of very practical 
solution-seeking moves that are remarkably robust to this day and now serve as 
the model for suggestions about how to solve legal problems and seek creative 
solutions. She suggested "disaggregation" of problems (making them smaller), 
by looking at their constituent elements, what is often referred to as ''breaking up 
the whole." She also suggested that sometimes, the opposite could be true; that 
we should search for the "whole demand-the real demand" which might be 
37 FOUEIT, supra note 15, at 67-68. 
38 Thus, she held similar views to those of us who say that negotiation, mediation, and 
other forms of ADR are not about compromise. See generally John Coons, Compromise As 
Precise Justice, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW AND POUTICS 190 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John Chapman eds., 1979); MENKEL-MEADow, supra note 9; John Coons, Approaches to 
Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 750 
(1964). 
39 FOUEIT, supra note 15, at 69; FISHER & URY, supra note 2, at 40. She is also often 
credited with the orilIlge story where one person desires the orange, the other the peel. Kolb, 
supra note 35, at 339; see also her description of the argument between dairy farmers about 
unloading on a platform that was reconfigured to support both of them, FOLLETT, supra note 
15, at 69-70. 
40 FOUEIT, supra note 15, at 75. 
8 
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obscured by miscellaneous minor claimS.41 Follett anticipated the scripted 
negotiation plans of today, as well as the complex "webs" of "polycentric" 
disputes42 by suggesting that the good conflict manager would "anticipate" 
responses and recognize that every action by oneself set off a reaction in the 
other that one would then respond to; in other words, our actions and responses 
are all "circular" or "interdependent" in today's language. Follett suggested that 
we are equally responsible for anything that happens as a result of setting in 
motion our own actions and responses to our own actions.43 Follett believed that 
we hurt ourselves whenever we see ourselves "imprisoned" in an "either-or 
situation,"44 urging people to look for solutions that were better than the two 
obvious alternatives. Because "integrative" solutions require innovation and 
imagination, she believed (and preached) dynamic, participative and creative 
problem solving. Those in business administration and management who are 
looking at consensus building, participatory leadership, and joint venture models 
of economic decisionmaking are currently appreciating Follett's work.45 
Part of the attraction of her work is that Follett wrote and spoke clearly and 
simply. She was one of the first to successfully marry theory and practice, for she 
had a fIrm belief that it was only through the experience of achieving integrative 
solutions that people could fully understand that achievement; understanding 
(like Weber's verstehen) had to be "knitted into the structure of [one's very] 
being."46 She saw that solutions to negotiated problems and conflicts would 
emerge from relationships and interconnected interaction, not from top-down 
force or artifIcially imposed ideas or concepts. 
This mother of invention saw clearly in the 1920s that there were better ways 
to make use of conflict-to embrace it and to use it for more creative and 
innovative solutions,47 in addition to the purpose of making more peace or better 
41 FOUEIT, supra note 15, at 79. Many of these useful and concrete suggestions for 
seeking integrative solutions, including contingent solutions and conditional agreements, 
have been elaborated in DAVID LAX & JAMES SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: 
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITNE GAIN (1986) and MAx H. BAZERMAN & 
MARGARET NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 89-101 (1992). 
42 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. cAL. L. REv. 305 (1971). 
43 FOUEIT, supra note 15, at 81. 
44 Though she did not operate in the legal system, she did work in another adversarial, 
"two-sided" environment-labor relations. 
45 E.g., FOUEIT, supra note 15, at 87; John Child, Organizational Structure, 
Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice, 6 Soc. 1 (1972). 
46 Davis, supra note 36, at 227. 
47 For a recent effort to reintroduce these ideas into creative legal problem solving, see 
generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and 
Teachable in Legal Education?, HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001). 
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processes (though she believed in those things too). Follett saw better, more 
satisfying and longer lasting outcomes in integrative solutions that were not the 
result of contested and "split the difference" compromise. In this, she sought 
better, more pareto-optimal solutions, like so many of the major contributors to 
the ADR field. 
ill. THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF DISPUTING 
It is somewhat ironic that one of the most influential "mothers" of our field 
has demonstrated a complex, if ambivalent, perspective on disputing processes. 
As one of the leading legal anthropologists who helped to conceptualize the 
study of disputes and legal systems as one of the most important constituent 
elements of a society, Laura Nader described and valorized the mediational 
practices of the Zapotec Indians she studied in Talea, Mexico.48 There, she 
demonstrated how a closely knit and isolated community drawing on its needs 
for internal harmony and solidarity created a mediation-like dispute resolution 
process.49 Some years later (and at one of the Schwartz lectures at The Ohio 
State University College of Law), Nader denounced American "deformations" 
of informal disputing processes where "pacification" and the desire for peace 
were seen to be in opposition to the achievement of justice through confrontation 
in the courts. 50 
Like other legal anthropologists who seem to venerate American forms of 
legalism when they are home,51 Nader reminds us that disputing processes are 
48 LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC 
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (1990); see also LITTLE INJUSTICES: LAURA NADER LoOKS AT THE LAW 
(Odyssey Films, PBS Video, 1980). 
49 In a pathbreaking empirical study of disputing within an American context, law and 
economics scholar Robert Ellickson demonstrated how closely interdependent neighbors 
(cattle ranchers in a remote California county) evolved cooperative dispute resolution 
mechanisms as well as their own substantive rules, outside of the formal institutions and 
directions of substantive law. Ellickson's empirical study demonstrated, to his surprise, the 
"trumping" of both formal law and law and economics theories (the Coase Theorem) by 
norms of social cooperation (now called "social norm theory"). ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
50 Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and 
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESoL. 
1 (1993); see also Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion-The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal 
Reform, 8 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 269 (1988). 
51 E.g., RICHARD ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982); SALLY MERRY, 
GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKJNG-CLASS 
AMERICANS (1990). Cf William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on 
Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & SOC'y REv. 63, 86 (1974) (suggesting that we need more field 
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intimately tied to the culture in which they are situated. Legal regimes both 
constitute and are constitutive of the cultures in which they are embedded and 
the way people "process" conflicts and disputes tells us a great deal about what 
their culture values. Disputing institutions will reflect the culture's values, and 
it may not be wise to attempt to transplant a form of disputing that is not 
indigenous to or compatible with a different culture. Legal anthropologists see 
variation and are interested in comparisons, as well as processes of change; they 
are less inclined to see universal or uniform structures that can be made to work 
in quite the same way in different cultural settings. 52 Thus, in her later work, 
Nader denounces court ADR programs as efforts to import a non-American form 
of mediation to manage and divert important legal cases from the docket. Nader 
is particularly concerned that settlement, mediation, and the secrecy which often 
accompanies them will prevent important facts from becoming publicly known, 
in a culture that prizes public knowledge, class action lawsuits, precedents and 
punishment, perhaps more than it values peace and harmony.53 In Nader's 
analysis, the American ADR movement was captured by a coercive ideology and 
court administrative hierarchy that sought to diminish caseloads at a time of 
expanding legal rights for the disempowered. 
Nader reminds us that methods of dispute resolution, in all of its forms, are 
not neutral-they are designed and implemented by parties, court administrators 
or governments with substantive agendas. Thus, we must always interrogate the 
studies of American dispute resolution institutions to compare to what has been studied in 
"foreign" sites, from where most dispute theory has been derived). 
52 See generally CLIFFORD GEERlZ, LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER EsSAYS IN 
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (2d ed. 2000); AVRUCH, supra note 16; MARK H. Ross, THE 
MANAGEMENT OFCONFllCf: INTERPRETATIONS AND INTEREsTs IN COMPARATIVE PERsPECTIVE 
(1993). For a rigorous attempt to analyze the comparative universals and differences in 
dispute resolution institutions, both in time (history) and place (culture), see generally 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981). 
53 Nader has studied American consumer disputes, as well as disputes in other cultures, 
by receiving reports of consumer complaints from hundreds of letters obtained from her 
consumer advocate brother, Ralph Nader. Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 
88 YALE LJ. 998, 1003 (1979). It was the dogged investigative and litigative efforts of 
Ralph Nader that produced evidence of design defects in the Chevrolet Corvair, responsible 
for many automobile deaths. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANy SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN 
DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965); Jonathan Rabinovitz, Nader's Museum 
of Liability: Corvairs, Pintos and Implants, N.Y. TiMES, July 28, 1998, at Al (observing 
Ralph Nader's efforts to reveal "design flaws of the Chevrolet Corvair and other 
automobiles"); Stuart Diamond, Warren Anderson: A Public Crisis, A Personal Ordeal, 
N.Y. TiMES, May 19, 1985, at 1 (noting that "General Motors responded to consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader's discovery of safety problems with the [Chevrolet] Corvair by 
initiating a personal attack against Mr. Nader"). 
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purposes for which a process of dispute resolution is being invoked. How did this 
particular institution come to be? What values does it serve? Who is achieving 
what with the particular structure of the system in place? In dispute resolution, 
power will be located somewhere, and there are consequences to who possesses 
and controls it and how that power will be exercised. 54 For Nader, there is 
always the danger that externally imposed dispute resolution systems (whether 
imposed by American judges or legislators in domestic situations55 or "rule of 
law" legal institutions or American-style arbitration in "foreign countries") are 
designed to "colonize" or "control" those who would have disputes or conflicts, 
either with each other or with the state or other official "regimes." Attempts to 
"universalize" or "globalize"56 legal procedures or dispute resolution systems 
(such as in international or multi-national regimes) will either run roughshod 
over specific community or nation-state practices or be seen for what they are--
conflict resolution by "domination." 
Nader's attention to the social and cultural situatedness of dispute resolution 
has resonated with a number of critics of ADR, both about mediation and 
arbitration, usually in their compulsory or mandatory fonns. Thus, where 
mediation is thought to be designed to provide flexible, future-oriented solutions, 
critics point out that in cases of divorce, wronged and financially less secure 
women may be manipulated to compromise and give up too much.57 Similarly, 
others have argued that without the protection of the "rule of law" and the 
54 For a more recent application of these theories and questions on attempts to negotiate 
nuclear waste storage on American Indian lands, see generally Laura Nader & Jay Ou, 
Anthropological Perspectives: Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native 
American Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 13 (1998). 
55 Nader does not see the client empowerment and choice agenda promoted by many 
proponents of multi-door courthouses and cou{t-annexed ADR. Sander, supra note 1. 
Instead she sees a deliberate plan to turn back the rights revolution of the 1960s in Supreme 
Court Justice Warren Burger's embrace of ADR as a docket clearing device. Warren Burger, 
Agenda for 2000 A.D.: A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECfIvES ON JUSTICE IN THE FuTURE 23-25 (A. Leo Levin & Russell 
Wheeler eds., 1979); Warren Burger, The St{lte of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62. 
56 Nader argues that globalization is not new; the colonial powers all sought 
globalization of their interests and cultures. What is new is American globalization and 
institutional imperialism. Laura Nader, Comments, 46 AM. J. COMPo L. 751, 754 (1998). See 
generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 
(1999). 
57 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ. 
1545, 1603 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on 
Mediation, Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1413, 1420 (1997). Contra 
Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REv. 467, 492-93 (1991); 
Joshua Rosenberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings & Proposals, 26 U.S.F. 
L. REv. 343, 390 (1992). 
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formality of the courtroom, racial and ethnic minorities58 as well as the 
economically disadvantaged59 will be taken advantage of by the more 
contextually powerful within the informal settings of ADR. Though she is not 
the only one, Nader's political and anthropological critique has provided an 
important standard against which to measure whether justice is being 
compromised in the quest for other values, like peace, harmony, or simple 
caseload reduction. Nader also reminds us that comparative law and legal 
anthropology studies may not tell us the same things. Legal scholars tend to 
export their concepts, like courts, mediation, and dispute resolution, and measure 
them against or compare them to an ethnocentrically developed model;60 while 
anthropologists are more likely to see the variations, not only in institutions, but 
in nomenclature and purpose.61 
IV. THE FuNCTIONAL AND MORAL INTEGRITY OF DISPUTE 
PROCESSES 
If dispute resolution systems have social and cultural variations, Lon Fuller 
and Soia Mentschikoff (among other legal theorists of both the legal realism and 
legal process schools) argued that each dispute resolution process has its own 
particular function, purpose, morality, and integrity. In many ways, Lon Fuller 
remains the only legal philosopher to take theorizing about dispute resolution 
processes seriously. Like his intellectual executor, Kenneth Winston,62 I believe 
58 MICHELEliERMANNET AL., THE METROCOURT PROJEcr FlNALREPORT, atx (1993); 
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Fonnality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution. 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359, 1396; Gary LaFree & Chri~tine 
Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity aiui Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated 
and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & Soc'y REv. 767, 789 (1996)'. 
59 ABEL, supra note 51, at 3. 
60 I have argued elsewhere that American mediation can be seen as an ethnocentrically 
biased approach which privileges talk and psychological and interpersonal problem solving 
over reticence or other forms of dispute resolution. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways 
of Mediation: The Transfonnations of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11 
NEGOT. J. 217. 223 (1995). 
61 Laura Nader, A Comparative Perspective on Legal Evolution, Revolution, and 
Devolution, 81 MICH. L. REv. 993, 995-97 (1983). 
62 FuLLER, supra note 17, Introduction, at 12. A few other scholars have made the 
connection between Fuller's legal pililosophy and dispute resolution theory. See, e.g., 
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADvERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO 
ADJUDICATION 47 (1988); Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the 
False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. 
L. REv. 1273, 1275 (1995); Alfred W. Meyer, To Adjudicate or Mediate: That is the 
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that Fuller was interested in the differences among the different legal processes 
because he practiced law (during World War II with the law fIrm of Ropes and 
Gray in Boston) and continued to serve as an arbitrator, even after resuming 
teaching and scholarship at Harvard. Because he was a "reflective 
practitioner,"63 who enjoyed lawyering and thought that lawyers were socially 
useful,64 as well as a thoughtful scholar who recognized the different modalities 
of argument, decision, and action in different legal fora, Fuller was able to 
attempt a detailed analysis of the particular moralities of the different processes 
he wrote about, including adjudication, arbitration, mediation, legislation, 
contract, and managerial direction.65 In his expositions of the "essentials" of each 
of these processes he has"been labeled a "secular natural law" theorist, because 
of his attributions of an almost theological purity to each of the separate legal 
processes. 
For Fuller, different case types, parties and particular needs led, logically, if 
not inexorably, to a particular legal process.66 Each kind of legal process had its 
own internal structure, logic, and even an essential morality. In this, Fuller was 
an essentialist67 and a legal moralist. While many of his statements about and 
defInitions of these processes remain classic in their analytic purity and rigidity, 
they can, in some respects, help us take stock of the dispute resolution fIeld and 
how it has evolved. As the scope and breadth of dispute resolution has become 
more complicated and has developed moralities of its own,68 Fuller's 
Question. 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 357, 367 (1993); John H. Langbein. The German Advantage 
in Civil Procedure. 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 843-44 (1985). 
63 DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECfIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN 
AcrION (1983); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald SchOn. The Reflective Practitioner, and 
the Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6 CUNICALL. REv. 401, 412 (2000). 
64 David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801. 
801 (1998). 
65 ill some versions he added elections and lotteries as other "legal processes." Kenneth 
I. Winston. Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 17 at 27. 
66 In this, I believe he was closer to the structural functionalism of the American 
sociology of the 1950s than others would allow. E.g., TALCorrPARSoNs, ON INsmUTIONS 
AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 106-114 (Leon H. Mayhew ed., 1982). Contra Kenneth I. Winston. 
Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER. supra note 17 at 31 (Winston separates 
Fuller's conceptions of legal institutions from sociological "functionalism"); Bone, supra 
note 62, at 1313 n.152. See generally RETHINKING PROGRESS: MOVEMENTS. FORCES AND 
IDEAS AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY (Jeffrey C. Alexander & Piotr Sztompka 
eds.,1990). 
67 "Our task is to separate the tosh from the essential." Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 356 (1978). 
68 Whether ADR processes actually require their own moralities in the form of formal 
ethical rules is a subject on which I have spilled much ink. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
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pronouncements on the internal integrity of each process may no longer compel 
us with the persuasive force they once had. 
Lon Fuller was particularly interested in patterns of social ordering in which 
law provided a basic structure of empowering laws (procedural or adjectival law) 
that helped institutions develop substantive or "restraining" rules, which, in tum, 
permitted society to function. Fuller wanted to call the phenomenon in which he 
was interested eumonics, or "the science, theory, or study of good order and 
workable social arrangements."69 For Fuller, law was a "problem solving 
activity" purposively directed towards enabling voluntary transactions and 
contracts, preventing violence, defming ideals and standards for civic 
participation, as well as providing a means for settling disputes and preserving 
social harmony. Law was enacted in and enforced by a variety of different legal 
institutions, which is why some commentators refer to him as concerned, above 
all else, with "problems of institutional design,"70 or as an "architect of social 
structure."71 Fuller saw that lawmaking and rulemaking occurred in the realms 
of private ordering-negotiating contracts and mediating solutions produced as 
much "law" as the public institutions of courts and legislatures. In his efforts to 
elaborate the different structures, functions, and moralities of different legal 
processes, Fuller wrote the first description of, and most sustained argument for, 
mediation. He said that this conciliatory process, which did not require a decision 
of state-made law, would "reorient the parties to each other" and "brin[g] about 
a more harmonious relationship between the parties, whether this be achieved 
through explicit agreement, through a reciprocal acceptance of 'social norms' 
relevant to their relationship or simply because the parties have been helped to 
a new and more perceptive understanding of one another's problems."72 For 
Fuller, as for other theorists of mediation, its principal functional strength lay in 
its release of the parties "from the encumbrances of rules and of accepting, 
instead, a relationship of mutual respect, trust and understanding that will enable 
them to meet shared contingencies without the aid of formal prescriptions laid 
Ethics in Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of 
Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 407, 408 (1997); Canie Menkel-Meadow, The 
Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary 
Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 658 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and 
Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 163-{)7 (1999). 
14. 
69 Kenneth 1." Winston, Introduction to PRINCIPlES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 17 at 
70Id. at 13, 31. 
71 Luban, supra note 64, at 817. 
72 Fuller, supra note 42, at 308. 
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down in advance."73 Mediation, in Fuller's words, is for "the administration and 
enforcement of rules or social norms"74 between parties, not for the creation of 
state-made law. 
Fuller's functionalist definition of mediation, as being confined to either the 
improvement or termination of relationships (he focused on collective 
bargaining, divorce, and other familial relations and long-term business 
contracts), remains an important strand in the current justification of mediation 
which either assumes a long-term relationship between the parties, or hopes that 
even a single conflictual encounter can be transformed into an event of "mutual 
recognition, understanding, and empowerment."75 Whether mediation ought to 
be confmed to particular kinds of disputes or whether it can be used in any form 
of conflict or dispute remains a much debated question today.76 
Lon Fuller, as the leading jurisprudential thinker about ADR, as well as a 
legal pluralist, recognized that different kinds of disputes required different kinds 
of processes and that processes themselves might be limited in their 
appropriateness for certain human activities. For Fuller, each process of 
decisionmaking, or as he preferred to say, "problem solving"77 had its own logic, 
morality, and function. Fuller acknowledged that not all legal disputes or social 
problems were similarly structured. Where a problem was like a "spider web" in 
which unraveling one thread of a "polycentric" problem (such as deciding a 
single legal issue in a web of relationships such as occurred in a factory among 
labor and management or in a marriage) might destroy the whole web, mediation, 
with its ability to work on many issues at the same time and focus the parties on 
their relationship concerns, would be better.78 
Fuller's prescient essay on the functional logic of mediation as a process of 
relationship recommitment and reorientation in situations which would be 
inappropriate for adjudication is less accurate when it comes to the structure of 
disputes. Fuller wrote that mediation worked best with dyadic conflicts, and he 
failed to anticipate the extensive use of mediation processes in complex multi-
party disputes like environmental matters, resource allocations, mass torts, or 
complex commercial disputes with insurers present. Fuller also seems somewhat 
73 [d. at 325-26. 
74 [d. at 328. 
75 ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: 
REsPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNmON 94-95 (1994). 
76 Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 50 (1994) (presenting a 
taxonomy for deciding which dispute process is appropriate for particular purposes). 
77 Letter from Lon L. Fuller to a Colleague at Harvard Law School (1972), in THE 
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 17, at 125. 
78 Fuller, supra note 42, at 326. 
16 
HeinOnline -- 16 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 17 2000-2001
THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDERS OF ADR 
contradictory about the role of "lawmaking" in mediation when he asserts that 
mediation is for administration and enforcement of laws and not for "state" 
lawmaking, while simultaneously recognizing that the process of mediation 
"enables the parties to work out their own rules. The creation of rules [such as 
in the labor-management relation] is a process that cannot itself be rule-
bound .... "79 Mediation, then, is a site for private lawmaking, or, in Fuller's 
terms, "rulemaking" which, when developed from sufficient mutual trust 
between the parties, will not require drawing on the formal contract. 
Fuller saw mediation as internally justified by its orientation to the parties' 
relationships, and it is their mutuality, consent, and reciprocity that guides the 
process and legitimates it. If there is an external justification for mediation in 
Fuller's conception, it is that mediation is essentially a private process between 
a third party facilitator and two parties already in a relationship or trying to make 
a relationship work. Thus, Fuller's conception supports the claims of those 
mediation proponents who seek to keep mediation voluntary, consensual, 
facilitative, and non-evaluative.80 
On the other hand, Fuller's jurisprudence is sufficiently protean that he 
recognized the existence, if not the full value, of what we currently refer to as 
"mixed processes" which render the structure of mediational processes far more 
complex and have led to our current debates about the forms of techniques and 
"evaluations" in mediation. He observed mixed models of negotiation, 
mediation, and arbitration, with "threats" of adjudication, at the War Labor 
79 In his essay on the limits of adjudication, Fuller notes that the American Arbitration 
Association "strives to keep its arbitrators from assuming the role of mediators," so that they 
will not confuse claims of rights from the kind of relationship readjustment that is the 
mainstay of mediation. Fuller, supra note 67, at 370; see also Fuller, supra note 42, at 326. 
80 Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REv. 937, 938 (1997). 
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Board during World War II. He recognized the teachings of his Legal Process 
school colleagues, Henry M. Hart (not to be confused with H.L. A. Hart!) and 
Albert Sacks81 that mUltiple procedures of "institutional settlement" (including 
various forms of legal decisionmaking) "enriched the routes to social ordering" 
and made them more "flexible by various mixed forms."82 
Yet Fuller's work is stilI best known for seeking to elucidate the particular 
moralities of particular process modalities. Fuller's strength as a theorist of 
process is that he fully elaborated the structures and functions and the "internal" 
moralities of each of the legal processes he studied. He gave us what probably 
still is the deepest and most "classic" statement of what mediation is. However, 
perhaps because he was somewhat encumbered by the structuralist-functionalist 
schools of both social science and the legal process school of jurisprudence of 
the 1950s and 19605, structure and function were seldom rearranged or allowed 
to "mix" in his work on social ordering. Today's "hybrid" processes combine the 
structures of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration to attempt to perform a wide 
variety of functions, from relationship reorientation to dispute settlement to 
conflict resolution to administrative rulemaking and public policy 
decisionmaking. It would be fascinating to see what Lon Fuller would make of 
81 HART & SACKS, supra note 25. 
82 loN L. FullER, Irrigation and Tyranny, in PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER supra note 
17, at 200. In this piece, Fuller presciently sees the modem environmental mediation: 
"Problems concerned with the sharing of water supplies and the joint utilization of river 
systems are inherently unsuited to adjudicative solution, involving as they do a complex 
interplay of diverse interests." Id. at 210. Although Fuller saw modem administrative law 
in the management of water issues, much of what he says in this article anticipates the 
coordination of "joint utilization" in many modem environmental mediations. 
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these more flexible procedural institutions as the modem world of social ordering 
develops increasing complexity and reorganizes structures to meet the 
requirements of different functions. 
The debates represented in current controversies surrounding the use of 
mediation continue the challenge that Fuller has set for us-do particular forms 
of dispute resolution or problem solving institutions have their own integrity, 
logic, and morality? Are the techniques, procedures, and mechanics of each 
suitable only for a particular process, a particular kind of problem?83 Should 
arbitrators84 and judges85 never mediate, and mediators86 never adjudicate or 
evaluate? In Fuller's views these separate processes should never be mixed: 
Mediation and arbitration have disti·nct purposes and hence distinct 
moralities. The morality of mediation lies in optimum settlement, a settlement 
in which each party gives up what he values less, in return for what he'values 
more. The morality of arbitration lies in a decision according to the law of the 
contract. The procedures appropriate for mediation are those most likely to 
uncover that pattern of adjustment which will most nearly meet the interests of 
both parties. The procedures appropriate for arbitration are those which most 
securely guarantee each of the parties a meaningful chance to present 
arguments and proofs for a decision in his favor. Thus, private consultations 
with parties, generally wholly improper on the part of an arbitrator, are an 
indispensable tool of mediation.87 
In Fuller's understanding, everything about the different processes was 
different: the importance of finding facts, the role of precedent (both formally 
legal and in practice routines), who the third party neutral might be (including 
different kinds of neutrality and legal background), and the most opportune 
timing for use of the processes. Fuller believed strongly that arbitrators should 
never try to mediate. There would be too much "'confusion of role,"'88 and 
clarity of role within a pure process was essential both for that process' integrity, 
and for the legitimacy of whatever out~ome might be reached. For 
decisionmakers in adjudicative processes (whether in court or arbitration) it was 
83 Sander & Goldberg, supra note 76, at 50. 
84 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 15 NAT'L 
ACAD. ARB. PROC. 8 (1962). 
85 See generally Fuller, supra note 67, at 353. 
86 Fuller, supra note 42, at 305. 
87 LoN L. FullER, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COllECTIVE 
BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FiFrEENTH ANNUAL 
MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29 (Mark L. Kahn' ed., 1962). 
881d. at 33. 
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central, for Fuller, that third parties be "detached" and "impartial"; in other 
processes the third parties' knowledge of or embeddedness in the field might 
actually be an advantage. 
In his work on arbitration and adjudication, Fuller explored the importance 
of decisions rendered by third party neutrals who would consider arguments and 
make decisions on behalf of one party, based on reasons. Those reasons, or 
agreed upon principles of law, were important to justify the particular decision 
and bind people and communities together in generally accepted understandings 
of what their communities valued. In this, adjudication is a public function (in 
the cases for which it was appropriate), as many current critics of ADR see it.89 
However, unlike many modern "litigation romanticists,"90 Fuller thought that 
adjudication was not appropriate in a wide category of matters, including 
"managerial" or "administrative matters," requiring deeper knowledge and an 
understanding of the embedded and complex interactions of an organization or 
industry. Similarly, he did not find adjudication appropriate in situations which 
required "reciprocity" (i.e., marriage, business partnerships, contracts), nor in 
situations in which some other process was appropriate like elections, or in some 
cases, lotteries. Finally, he found adjudication unsuitable in situations that he 
labeled "polycentric" disputes, where multiple parties or a multiplicity of 
interests might be affected so that the binary solutions of adjudication could not 
resolve all the aspects of the issue, or where "decision" on one legal issue might 
unravel other interrelated issues or relationships. For Fuller, the core of 
adjudication (and arbitration) consisted of the need for parties to present their 
proofs (with evidence and reasoned arguments) in order to obtain decisions (by 
judges) to problems requiring authoritative resolutions from someone outside of 
the dispute or conflict. Adjudication is required when reasons and rationality are 
required (most often in claims of right or in declarations of guilt or innocence) 
and in Fuller's terms, not all human problems should be resolved in this 
particular form of "rationality."91 Adjudication, in Fuller's conception, required 
the adversarial presentation of two sides of a case: 
89 Fiss, supra note 8, at 1075; Bone, supra note 62, at 1298. 
90 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: 
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1874-75 (1997). 
9 I Late in his life Fuller expressed a humanistic philosopher's concerns with the "new" 
sciences of game theory being applied to judicial decisionmaking. He feared the reductionist 
assumptions of economic interests and self-interested strategic behavior as the only forces 
that could motivate both judges and parties: 
20 
The chief danger in any application of game theory to judicial decision-making 
lies in the fact that it is essentially a theory of satisfactions that are, broadly speaking, 
'economic' in nature, that is, are atomistic and individual. It is concerned with the 'pay-
off and not with the rewards of the game itself .... So judges may derive rewards from 
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An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting this 
natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which 
is not yet fully known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in 
suspension between two opposing interpretations of it. While the proper 
classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is time to explore all of 
its peculiarities and nuances.92 ' 
This assumption, that there are only two sides of a case, limits the usefulness 
of adjudication in many modem cases in which there are more than two sides, 
especially in modem litigation with interventions, class actions, interpleaders, 
and more than one issue to be determined. In this, Fuller saw more limits than 
advantages to adjudication in its capacity for social ordering in many important 
contexts. He was deeply skeptical about the use of adjudication in matters of 
deep social conflict, especially when social conditions might change faster than 
adjudication could "process" them. He had enough foresight to understand the 
development of mixed processes, such as in the wage setting processes he 
observed in his years at the War Labor Board, where he witnessed hybrids of 
negotiation and mediation, with threats of adjudication and some forms of med-
arb. He found these hybrids disturbing, referring to most of these processes as 
"parasitic" on the purer forms. He believed that most of them would eventually 
fail and fall away, by leading to unstable or contested resolutions, because the 
underlying legitimacy of the form of process could inevitably be questioned post 
hoc. 
Fuller's questions about process integrity and morality,93 as well as 
structural-functionalism, remain with us today. His focus on relationships 
introduces one of the major controversies in the field: whether mediation's 
collaborative efforts that transcend individual 'pay-offs.' ... To see what this danger is 
we need only recall that what ajudge may want (some of us are naive enough to hope 
that this is what he will always want) is a decision that is just, proper, and workable. 
Lon L. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1604, 
1607 (1966). 
92 Fuller, supra note 67, at 383. 
93 In addition to Fuller, there are others who have articulated a "morality" for particular 
processes. Murray Schwartz argued for different ethical rules of candor and disclosure and 
refusal to enforce substantively "unconscionable" negotiated agreements in private settings, 
as distinguished from what was required in open court. Murray L. Schwartz, The 
Professionalism and Accountability of lAwyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 685-86 (1978). We 
are now engaged in many disputes about the appropriate ethical standards to apply in 
litigation, transactional work, mediation, and arbitration. See Center for Professional 
Responsibility, Ethics 2000-Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Prof. Conduct, 
at http://www.abanet.org!cpr/ethics2k.htrnl (last visited Nov. 15,2000); see also Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1977), available at http://www.adr.org. 
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purpose is to settle disputes and solve problems, an instrumentalist concern, or 
whether it is the reorientation of the parties to each other that characterizes what 
mediation, in particular, offers to human conflict. Fuller, like some modem 
commentators, sought to keep functions and structures separate. Some of us more 
modem theorists and practitioners believe it is possible to achieve mUltiple 
purposes or functions within more adaptive processes. Problems can be solved 
and relationships may be "reoriented" within the same process. Mediation is an 
"and/and," rather than an "either/or" process. 
Lon Fuller, however, was not the only "parent" of process integrity. Soia 
Mentschikoff, one of the first women to leave a deep imprint on legal 
institutions, also argued for the particular strengths of non-adjudicative forms of 
dispute resolution. This "mother" of ADR, perhaps because of her many years 
serving as a Reporter on the Uniform Commercial Code, noted the procedural 
analogies94 of dispute resolution to the substantive formulations of "common 
usage" and "reasonable practice, trade, or custom." For her, arbitration was an 
opportunity for those within an industry to self-govern and to find solutions that 
met their specific needs, instead of some generalized interests: "I think that self-
government of such groups has necessitated a system of dispute resolution 
among its members and that arbitration has been chosen in preference to the 
courts, just as trade-rule or custom formulation was chosen in preference to 
formal legislative action."95 
Arbitration was not negotiation-it was not without rules. Mentschikoff 
argued, in sharp contrast to other proponents of arbitration, that arbitration did 
have rules and did utilize the rules of evidence. What arbitration does with rules 
is to examine them in the context of the particular dispute and to exercise a kind 
of common sense, rather than to apply an overly rigid or formal application. 
Hearsay objections are made and then considered for the ultimate reliability of 
the testimony offered. 
Unlike Fuller, Mentschikoff actually undertook to study the variety of 
dispute processes empirically and thus, in a sense, is also the "mother" of 
empirical evaluation of dispute resolution. In studying a variety of trade 
association forms of dispute resolution, Mentschikoff was able to develop a 
taxonomy of forms of dispute resolution that included umpireal (arbitral), 
adjudicative, and investigative models.96 In a highly sophisticated legal and 
94 Is there a "feminist" story here? Soia Mentschikoff focused on process, as well as 
substance, while Karl Llewellyn and other legal scholars and reporters focused more on the 
substance of the proposed rules. 
95 Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 710 (1952). 
96 Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 846 (1961). 
Lisa Bernstein, appropriately now located at the University of Chicago, where Mentschikoff 
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sociological analysis, Mentschikoff noted a variety of factors that would 
determine not only if commercial arbitration was used at all, but what form it 
would take, whether it was individually initiated by contract, administered 
arbitration by an outside body like the AAA or the ICC, or controlled by a trade 
association. Different issues, like the need for rapid price information, foreign 
trade and resale, or the quality assessment of delivered goods, militated in favor 
of or against particular kinds of arbitral fora. For Mentschikoff, arbitration 
clearly justified itself primarily when particularized expertise was required to be 
exercised (as in the assessment of the quality of goods and reasonable price). 
However, such factors as location of evidence (e.g., goods and documents) might 
also determine what kind of process is used because certain fora (both arbitral 
and adjudicative) are better for ordering production of documents.97 
Mentschikoff can also be seen as a student of process integrity and 
variability in her detailed historical and empirical descriptions of differences 
within industries and types of arbitration. Unlike the theoretical purity of Lon 
Fuller's work, Mentschikoff's association with legal realism98 caused her to be 
interested in how arbitration actually worked. First, she saw it as more principled 
and controlled by precedent than negotiation or mediation, which she saw as a 
compromise process, requiring parties to give up parts of their claims or 
demands. Second, she observed that well developed trade associations combined 
arbitral fora with rules of ethics and disciplinary codes in order to develop fully 
did most of her work as part of the law and behavioral science project at the University of 
Chicago, is replicating this work, looking at how modem trade associations resolve their 
disputes. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992). 
97 In their recent work analyzing the transformations in international commercial 
arbitration, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have noted the increasing influence of 
American-style litigation modes, even within the international arbitration community. YVES 
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND THE CONS1RUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 3-6 (1996). This 
has occurred, in large measure, because of discovery rules in the American legal regime and 
choice of law provisions often insisted on by American controlled companies. Id. 
Mentschikoff's work previews these developments. 
98 Of course, as another axis of comparison, one should note that Fuller's experience 
was in labor arbitration and Mentschikoff's in commercial arbitration. These divisions of 
kinds of cases are currently very much at issue as we debate the applicability of the Federal 
Arbitration Act to labor and employment settings. E.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. May 22,2000) (No. 
99-1379). Likewise, they are at issue as we consider the legal and policy issues implicated 
in the use of compulsory arbitration in both settings. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the 
"Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 
OHIO ST. J. oNDISP. REsoL. 19,31-35 (1999). 
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elaborated legal systems within the trade that tended to rely more on precedent 
and principle than more ad hoc forms of arbitration (thus demonstrating 
variability in the degree of self-regulated industries).99 She also noted that the 
failure to use attorneys in many trade controlled settings ensured that specific 
trade oriented standards, and not general legal principles, were emphasized. The 
American Arbitration Association, in contrast, provided a more ad hoc and 
casual form of arbitration which was dominated by lawyers and appealed to more 
general legal principles, and thus led to longer, more expensive, and more 
complex hearings. Because AAA arbitration awards often required court 
enforcement (as contrasted to trade enforcement), issues of procedure and 
enforceability and rules and judicial role became more important. Mentschikoff 
also contrasted the different forms of arbitration to other possible forms of 
decisionmaking; for instance, she examined courts and argued that arbitrators 
were more like jury members than judges in fact-finding and law application. In 
studying different forms of arbitration, she suggested that labor arbitration was 
as concerned with long-term contract interpretation as with the immediate 
dispute, while commercial arbitration looked to resolve specific and particular 
disputes fairly. 
Like a wise and modem student of ADR, Mentschikoff refused to pronounce 
on which processes were "better" than others. She was concerned with both the 
caliber and quality of third party neutrals in all systems (courts, trade association 
arbitration, and administered arbitration). As a legal realist and legal scholar, she 
was concerned about the quality of rules and norms generated by the different 
processes. On the whole, she found arbitrators to be as "rational" and norm-
based as judges, acknowledging that this could vary from case to case. 
(Statistically, one might say that the two processes on average looked the same 
on this dimension but that there were outliers Of "tails" in both processes.) 
As she and her husband, Karl Llewellyn, (and others) grappled with the 
larger jurisprudential and prudential issues of laws set down (legislation) versus 
norms to be evolved (custom or trade) in the drafting of the DeC, Mentschikoff 
found similar issues in the relationship of fact-finding and norm development 
99 Center for Public Resources, Model Arbitration Procedures and Practices, at 
http://www.cpradr.org. Oast visited Aug. 15,2000) (encouraging industry developed ADR 
systems (i.e., construction, franchising, employment, banking, and health care». 
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and enforcement in the variety of processes that could be used. Each process had 
its uses, each its distinctive advantages and disadvantages, and each was both 
structured by and, in turn, helped to structure the legal environment or culture 
from where it came. There were consequences to process choices--different 
processes both reflected and produced different rules and normative standards, 
but it could not be said that anyone process was perfect or appropriate for all 
kinds of matters (even in the delimited field of commercial law). Like her 
successors in the Legal Process school, Mentschikoff (and Fuller, as influenced 
by his Legal Process colleagues) could see the importance and significance of 
institutional variability and legitimacy in process. 
v. INSTITUTIONALIZED PROCESS: THE INSTITUTIONAL SETILEMENT 
PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL PROCESS 
Though few have made the argument explicit, much of the current penchant 
for "menus," "multi-door courthouses," and ''fitting the forum to the fuSS"loo can 
find its historical roots in the work of the Legal Process scholars, Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks. These scholars argued for a principle of "institutional 
settlement"101 or institutional competence or specialization-a purposive 
approach to legal institutions in which Lon Fuller sometimes joined: 102 
A legal system is a system-a coordinated, functioning whole made up of 
a set of interrelated, interacting parts. The solution of specific legal problems 
constantly'requires an understanding of the functions and interrelationships of 
more than one institutional process and frequently of several. Problems ariSing 
in a court call for a perceptive awareness not only of what cou~ are for but of 
what a legislature is for and sometimes also of what an administrative agency 
is for and of what matters can best be left to private decision .... Lawyers at 
the stage of private counseling have again and again to consider whether to 
100 Here we have another case of appropriation from another "father of invention." 
Maurice Rosenberg, a civil proceduralist par excellence (and eventual ADR teacher and 
scholar-one of the few proceduralists to embrace ADR) is the originator of the phrase 
''fitting the forum to the fuss." Sander & Goldberg, supra note 76, at 67. See generally 
Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 801 (1988) (endorsing the variability of dispute processes). 
101 HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 1. 
102 For a discussion of the evolving membership of the legal scholars who contributed 
to the Legal Process project, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical 
and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at li-
cxxxvi. For an argument that institutionalism was key to Fuller'S "process" jurisprudence, 
see Bone, supra note 62, at 1275. 
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invoke the procedures of private or of judicial settlement or, often alternatively, 
of legislative or administrative settlement. The development of these 
awarenesses calls for study which comes to grips with the questions of what 
each of these various processes of decision is good for and how each 
interrelates and interacts with the others. 103 
Hart and Sacks sought to explore the vanetles of ways in which 
decisionmaking is conducted in the legal system. They conceived of the legal 
system broadly, including both private and public forms of social and legal 
ordering. 104 Hart and Sacks resonate with the ADR "canon" or theory in many 
ways, as they demonstrated by opening their book with an effort to explain the 
necessity of "cooperation" in social life. 105 They spoke of "satisfying wants," 
thus employing the social welfare language that some ofus106 use today, and not 
103 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, Preface to the 1958 "Tentative Edition" of 
HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at cxxxvii. Here I must add a personal note and thank the 
"father" of many of my own inventions. Professor and former Dean David Filvaroff, 
currently of the Buffalo Law School, taught me the Legal Process materials at the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School, from which I believe I can date most of my academic interests, 
including my work in ADR and process theory generally, civil procedure and the importance 
of participatory and experiential learning in legal education. (I began and continue to teach 
clinically and experientially.) Filvaroff had groups of students participate in role-plays in 
which we treated the same legal problem (whether slumlordism should be made legally 
actionable through common law tort or regulatory action) in several different legal 
processual methods (legislative, judicial, and regulatory). Now I would add negotiated 
processes to the mix and try some new hybrid variations on the classic three branches of 
government-reg-neg, consensus building, mediation, and med-arb. 
104 Their book and teaching approach consisted of exploring these issues through 
specific legal problems to be solved. This is an important historical and pedagogical point 
to remember in light of current approaches to and suggestions for looking at lawyers as 
problem solvers. E.g., Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem Solvers: Keynote Address to the 
AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving 
Pedagogy Seriously: A Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGALEDUC. 14 (1999). 
105 Critics and historians would suggest that this optimism and focus on cooperation 
exemplified the period in which this work was written-the American euphoria and 
prosperity of the 1950s when we all believed in continuous economic progress and universal 
"expanding pies." That may be true, but the 1950s was also the time of the Cold War and 
direct adversarial engagement with a large and well-armed political foe, and it would have 
been just as easy to focus on adversarialism, distributive and scarcity problems, and war and 
conflict as cooperative American triumphilism. 
106 I specifically chose "needs" rather than "interests" as the concerns of parties to be 
dealt with in negotiation and dispute resolution. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 794. For 
some other uses of "needs" rather than "interests" theory, as applied to international conflict 
resolution, see generally CONFLICT: HUMAN NEEDS THEORY (John Burton ed., 1990). Of 
course, in the real world, both needs and interests will be expressed in conflicts and disputes, 
where they sometimes overlap and sometimes lead in different directions. 
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the more "neutral" or economistic "interests" of some bargaining literature. They 
also saw law as a "social science," concerning themselves with specifying the 
conditions under which human beings could peacefully co-exist and order their 
relations. They also recognized the variability of people, groups, and the 
institutions humans create to achieve their goals. Hart and Sacks saw 
"constitutive or procedural" understandings of people and groups as more 
fundamental than the substantive understandings that a group of people must 
arrive at-which is why we call it the legal "process" school. Institutionalized 
patterns of procedures and processes for making rules, jUdging violations, and 
structuring relationships are thus essential to any society which seeks to function 
smoothly. The "principle of institutional settlement," then, is that every society 
requires the establishment of "regularized and peaceable methods of decision" 
and that decisions made through these methods should be accepted as binding 
on the society "unless and until they are duly changed."107 Most importantly for 
our purposes, Hart and Sacks recognized that "different prqcedures and 
personnel of different qualifications invariably prove tQ, be appropriate for 
deciding different kinds of questions."108 
Hart and Sacks also recognized the importance of lawyers in processes 
designed to prevent disputes, by using their most creative powersl09 of 
transaction planning and framing. In their planning of relationships and 
transactions, through, for example, the drafting of contracts, wills, deeds, 
constitutions, statutes, and articles of incorporation, lawyers could consider both 
the creation of and application of rules, both substantive and procedural, that 
govern human interactions.110 Hart and Sacks, like Fuller, were intent on 
achieving recognition of the lawyer's role as "an architect of social structure,"111 
in addition to the more familiar role of representative in formal1itigation. Indeed, 
Hart and Sacks make among the first references to the lawyer's role as negotiator 
and dispute resolver by suggesting that the lawyer's function as a "representative 
107 HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 4. 
108 [d. 
109 For my application of these ideas of recognizing the "creativity" in legal transaction 
planning and doctrinal development, see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 47; 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity 
and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785 (2000). 
110 HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 175. 
III [d. at 176. This phrase has been adapted by more recent commentators as "process 
architect," "transaction cost engineer," and other similar phrases. E.g., Ronald Gilson, Value 
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 254-56 
(1984); Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value 
Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1,2 (1995). 
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in the private settlement of disputes without litigation" was every bit as important 
as the more well-known role of the lawyer in court. To perform this function well 
the lawyer needs to have "skill in anticipating the probable outcome of litigation 
and so in estimating the bargaining strength of each side; skill in negotiation in 
fmding common ground of mutual advantage between the parties; and skill in the 
formal exercise of the legal powers which make the settlement binding."112 
Hart and Sacks included private arbitration (in both the commercial and 
labor contexts) as one of the legal processes that lawyers must master,l13 while 
simultaneously presaging several of the issues we hotly debate now-such as the 
compulsory use of what was intended to be a voluntary and private process. Only 
after review of these important processes of private ordering and "internal 
dispute settlement" did Hart and Sacks canvass the more conventionally studied 
legal processes of courts and common law decisionmaking, as well as legislation, 
the political process, and administrative processes. I 14 The use of the Legal 
Process materials in American law schools for so many years, without 
publication, demonstrates the transition in forms of legal process, reasoning, 
problem solving, and institutional development that characterized this period of 
changing boundaries between public and private law and adjudication and the 
regulatory state. 115 While Hart and Sacks struggled more obviously with 
legislative and administrative process¥s, their recognition of the importance of 
private ordering and "alternative" legal processes, both in dispute settlement and 
prevention, as well as in transaction and arrangement formation, has made a 
112 HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 179. 
I I3 [d. at 304-30. 
114 Even in this, Hart and Sacks radically expanded what was commonly studied in 
legal education, with its almost exclusive focus on courts and judicial decisionmaking. Their 
detailed attention to political processes and legislation remains one of the primary and most 
complete sources of political bargaining processes in law, as contrasted to the "rational 
argument" form of decision making associated with so much of legal reasoning. For more 
modem applications of the differences in rational argument and bargaining models in 
Constitutional and other forms of law making, see generally JON ELSTER, Strategic Uses of 
Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT REsOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995); JON 
ELSTER, ALcHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1999); JON ELSTER, 
SOWMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONAUTY (1989); JON ELSTER, 
NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1989); CONSTlTUTIONAUSM AND DEMOCRACY 
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering 
the Constitution, 93 YALEL.J. 1013 (1984). 
115 For a more recent exploration of the false dichotomies in the public-private 
distinctions in the regulatory state, see generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000) (arguing that public and private actors 
"negotiate" their roles in regulation and governance in the modem administrative state). 
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major contribution to the pluralistic way in which we modern legal process 
scholars and practitioners see the world. 
The old Legal Process school has now givell birth to several strains of "new 
legal process" sensitivity, recognizing that proc;;ess is pluralistic and that different 
institutional arrangements of process are necessary to meet different kinds of 
individual and institutional needs. In one sense, the "new legal process" 
represented by ADR is a direct descendant of Hart and Sacks' Legal Process 
school, recognizing a greater diversity of legal processes that are responsible for 
maintaining social order. "Appropriate" dispute resolution processes recognize 
a fuller menu of primary and hybrid processes, including mediation, arbitration, 
med-arb, evaluative mediation, early neutral evaluation, summary jury, and judge 
trials,116 all of which reflect a combination of the primary processes of 
negotiation, adjudication, and mediation in order to achieve different results 
dependent on the kinds of parties, issues in qispute, or numbers of parties 
involved. Fuller's recognition of a "polycentric" dispute has given way to the 
realization that there are many kinds of polycentric disputes, some of which 
require public fora because they will make law for many others (e.g., negotiated 
rulemaking or reg-neg),117 but some which the parties prefer to deal with 
privately (e.g., the mini-trial). By ''fitting the forum to the fuss," lawyers and 
parties are now more sophisticated about analyzing which processes are 
appropriate for particular kinds of desired outcomes or procedures. 
While some have argued for a new form of "micro-institutionalism" in the 
study of legal institutions, following on from the "neo-institutionalism" in the 
social sciences,118 others that focus on process suggest that we can revivify some 
of the old forms. As deliberative democracy takes hold in social theory and 
political science in the theoretical work of Jurgen Haberrlias and the more 
practical explications of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,119 process itself 
has become re-enshrined as the characteristic which defmes democracy and 
legitimate political process. Communicative action through "ideal speech 
conditions" in which people articulate their arguments, both t6 persuade and to 
bargain 120 is thought to provide the new "glue" which will order social life and 
116 Alternatives to the High Costs of Litigation. The ABCs of ADR: A Dispute 
Resolution Glossary. 13 CPR INST. FORDISP. REsOL. 147. 150 (1995). 
117 Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. LJ. 1 (1982); 
Philip Harter, Fear of Commitment: An AjJliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKEL.J. 1389 (1997); 
JodyFreeman, Collaborative Governonce in the Administrative State, 45 UCLAL. REv. 1 
~m . . 
118 Rubin, supra note 26, at 1393. 
119 GUTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 28. 
120 HABERMAS, supra note 27. 
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keep widely diverse individuals together in a democratic state and a lively civic 
culture. Where we cannot agree on substantive ends (the old liberal saw), we can 
probably agree on processes through which we listen and try to persuade each 
other. Thus, while many of these theorists would deny it, modem democratic 
processes can be thought of as mediation writ large. 121 The recent 
experimentation with new forms of legal and political processes has revitalized 
aspects of legal and social decisionmaking that would likely hearten Hart and 
Sacks. Added to the older processes of private ordering, decisional-court, 
legislative and administrative processes, newer processes like "consensus 
building"122 broaden democracy's reach by involving stakeholders or interested 
parties in settings that engage participation beyond voting and professional 
representation. These processes encourage involvement in direct decision making 
in such matters as environmental siting and preservation, municipal government 
and funding, race and cultural difference issues, budgeting, socially divisive 
issues like abortion and afflrmative action, and formal regulation and mass tort 
liability.123 Even where specific decisions are not reached or solutions to 
"problems" are not found, dialogue and discourse in the public sphere offer a 
new "proceduralist" theory and practice124 of democracy. Thus, process 
pluralism is clearly an important legacy of the past that has adapted to new legal 
and social conditions. 
Lawyers, as consummate "proceduralists" and "process architects," have an 
important role to play in the implementation of more participatory and complex 
forms of process-a role which the Legal Process scholars saw as more 
variegated than simply litigating or advising. 125 
121 At least one model of mediation seeks just that-empowennent and recognition and 
mutual respect, not necessarily producing a particular outcome or "settlement." See BUSH 
& FOLGER, supra note 75, at 81-112. 
122 THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 29. 
123 It has been suggested that Judge Jackson should have constructed another type of 
process in the Microsoft antitrust action when it became clear that that was a multi-party (not 
two-sided) dispute. (Consider the conflicting roles of the state attorney generals juxtaposed 
with the federal government's interests, in addition to the obvious interests of Microsoft and 
the less obvious interests of a very complex consumer market). See United States v. 
Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D. D.C. 2000). 
124 Political philosophers are concerned about making the connections between the 
theory of discourse and deliberative democracy and its practice in the real world. See, e.g., 
BOHMAN, supra note 28, at ix-x. 
125 This is not to suggest that only lawyers may facilitate or design such new processes, 
but that lawyers may be particularly weII suited to marry legal fonnalities and requirements 
to more flexible, fair, and participatory modes of political and legal action. Whether lawyers 
hinder such processes by focusing too exclusively on legalistic or "due process" concerns 
or whether lawyers will learn to utilize their craft to develop flexible and effective new 
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VI. QUALITY OF OUTCOMES IN DISPUTE REsOLUTION 
For many proponents of ADR, however, the Fullerian purpose is not 
complexity or diversity of process, but better outcomes. As modem negotiation 
theorists urge "win-win"126 solutions, "expanding the pie, before dividing it" or 
creating value before claiming it,"127 it is useful to recall one early father, far 
removed from the legal arena. Vilfredo Pareto, as an economist and sociologist, 
is responsible for what we now call "pareto-optimality," an outcome 
measurement which searches for the best possible outcome for parties along an 
axis of preferences, in which each party is made as well off as possible without 
further harm to the other party.128 Some processes may be preferred because of 
their tendency to produce more pareto-optimal solutions, as in "strategic 
cooperation,"129 as studied by game theorists and decision scientists, in 
information sharing and trades that are made possible, but the goal is a utilitarian 
one of making the parties as well off as possible without unnecessary harm to 
each other. This does raise issues, however, about possible harmful externalities 
"exported" to others.130 
processes, to produce different kinds of outcomes remains to be seen. For some discussions 
of how lawyering constructs may both hinder and facilitate new institutional developments, 
see generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 31. See also Susan Sturm, From Gladiators to 
Problem Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy and the Legal 
Profession, 4 DUKEJ. GENDERL. & POL'y 119, 146-47 (1997); Roger Conner, Community 
Oriented lAwyering: An Emerging Approach to Legal Practice, NAT'LlNST. OF JUST. J., Jan. 
2000, at 26. 
126 This seems an appropriate time for me to say why "win-win" is not how I would 
describe negotiation or conflict resolution. In many disputes, and most legal conflicts it will 
be impossible for both (or all) parties actually to "win" something. Consider the criminal 
defendant who may bargain for a "better" deal (less incarceration), but who will still be 
imprisoned. We aim for solutions that are "better than" some other baseline (an inferior 
process or a more limited scope of possible remedies) so we can improve on what might 
otherwise be possible. That does not necessarily mean that all parties will "win" something. 
So, I prefer to stay away from the ''win-win'' language as much as I do not like "win-lose" 
either. We are just trying to avoid "lose-lose" (negative sum games) outcomes as much as 
possible. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Art and Science of Problem-Solving Negotiation, 
TRIAL, June 1999, at 48,49. 
127 LAX & SEBENlUS, supra note 41, at 30-33. See generally ROBERT MNOOKIN, 
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000). 
128 E.g., RAlFFA, supra note 23. . 
129 See, e.g., AxELROD, supra note 22; ADAM BRANDENBURGER & BARRY NALEBUFF, 
CO-OPETITION (1996). 
130 Many pareto-optimal solutions between transaction parties, for example, may result 
in throwing off costs to others (or decreased taxes paid to the IRS, for example), so a more 
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Similarly, much of the underlying and often implicit assumptions of 
negotiation and bargaining processes in modern ADR theory draw from the work 
of George Caspar Homans, who suggested that even with ''universal'' Maslovian 
needs,131 human beings have very different preferences and interests which will 
often be complementary, not conflicting. 132 Where people desire different things, 
trades (or "logrolling," as they say in game theory and politics)133 are possible 
and help to facilitate agreements. Thus, linking these insights about psychology 
to legal processes, what might be good for trial (narrowing issues) is actually 
dysfunctional for settlement-the more issues, the merrier, for more possible 
trades and a settlement point further out on the Pareto frontier. Thus, new legal 
process theorists have made use of a different form of social science than did the 
fIrst generation of realists-using the human psychology of decisionmaking, not 
only by legal elites, but by clients, parties, and others involved in legal disputes. 
Work done by psychologists who study creativity, for example, may provide 
some insights into how substantive legal solutions are actually crafted. 134 
Another little acknowledged "mother" of the fIeld provided one of the 
earliest and most interesting empirical studies of how differences in processes do 
produce different outcomes. In Settling the Facts: Discretion and Negotiation 
in Criminal Court,135 Pamela Utz studied the different plea bargaining processes 
of two different criminal court jurisdictions. In one, an adversarial, competitive 
model of prosecutors and defense counsel produced a highly conflictual, less 
efficient, and less effective system of criminal sentencing and social control. In 
broadly defined notion of pareto-optimality that was outcome focused might need to 
consider all possible parties affected by an outcome produced by a conflict resolution 
process. Consider, for example, children in a divorce or employees in a merger. 
131 See generally ABRAHAMH. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954). 
132 Recall Mary Parker Follett's window, my desire for chocolate icing and my 
brother's for cake, and the different preferences of those picking at a diverse cocktail mix 
(including peanuts, goldfish, pretzels, cashews, and wheatchex). Menkel-Meadow, supra 
note 7, at 1620 n.36. 
133 The term originates in the fact that it usually requires more than one person to 
coordinate "rolling" or moving a log. Martin P. Golding, The Nature of Compromise: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, in COMPROMISE IN Enrrcs, LAW AND POUI1CS, supra note 38, at 13-14. 
134 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 47; HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE 
THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1983); MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: 
FLow AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); TERESA AMABILE, 
CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996). One can look to Hart and Sacks' descriptions of legally 
creative regimes both in private ordering (percentage of gross commercial leases) and in 
statutory schemes and common law developments. See HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 
183. 
135 PAMELA Un, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL 
COURT (1978). 
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another court, with' another culture, prosecutors, defenders, and eventually, even 
the judges, constructed a more ''negotiable'' justice, with less overcharging, more 
realistic and tailored sentences with a philosophy of treatment and reduction of 
recidivism, rather than a purely punitive goal. 136 To the extent that the success 
of outcomes could be measured, Utz found that a culture of "substantive justice" 
obtained in the court with more reasonable and candid bargaining practices than 
in the court with more rigid and adversarial routines. Ironically, most of the 
impetus for a more "negotia,ted" plea bargain culture came from a desire to 
increase court efficiency and reduce judicial divisiveness. Utz's study of two 
courts remains one of the most carefully researched and thickly described 
empirical analyses of how different outcomes can result from variations in 
process. Her book is also an important arid rigorous explication of the advantages 
of some non-adjudicative approaches to even the most intractable of our legal 
system's problems-the criminal justice system. It is both heartening and 
discouraging at the same time to revisit such classic studies when we reflect on 
the current irony of less flexibility in the federal courts in determinate sentencing, 
as some states more creatively explore the kind of "substantive justice" or 
treatment goals described by Utz.137 
As scholars and practitioners of dispute resolution become more 
sophisticated about designing process to achieve particular outcomes, they have 
turned to other fields for insights about how the people inside of institutions 
behave. 
VII. BARRIERS TO AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISPUIE AND CONFLICT 
REsOLUTION 
I' 
Some legal scholars of dispute processing and conflict resolution have also 
drawn on the work of fathers in cognitive science to help us understand why 
resolving conflict is sometimes so difficult. In Kenneth Arrow's edited volume 
136 The studied courts were of two counties in California before determinate sentencing 
more or less eliminated the possibilities of individualistic and tailored sentences. 
137 In the criminal justice field, a growing number of state courts are utilizing multi-
disciplinary "problem solving courts" in drug, gun, family, and domestic violence settings. 
E.g., Judith Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How 
Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851, 857, 859-62 (1997). See generally Kim Taylor-
Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public Defender, 2 J. 
INST. STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 199 (1999); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug 
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 V AND. L. REv. 831 
(2000). 
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on Barriers to Conflict Resolution,138 psychologists describe the various 
reasoning errors and biased heuristics we use when reasoning alone or with 
others in the negotiation process. Distortions in thinking like reactive 
devaluation, availability, recency, primacy, loss and risk aversion, as well as 
overconfidence and labeling theory tell us that adversarial processes (and much 
of legal reasoning) may actually impede good dispute resolution by limiting what 
we can hear from the other side and how we can process important 
information.139 These theories and empirical results also help us understand the 
importance of curative actions we can take. Mediators who are neutral offerors 
of proposals and information can correct for reactive devaluation and reduce 
waste in informational distortions. 14o Thus, those who are concerned with 
resolving conflicts in either a qualitatively better or more efficient way are 
willing to recognize expertises that transcend the law and legal science. The 
teachings of our mothers and fathers-that dispute processing, even when legal, 
is psychologically and socially situated-are finally being assimilated. 
While cognitive science has illuminated some of the "barriers" to conflict 
resolution, other theorists and empiricists present a more optimistic picture for 
dispute resolution scholars and practitioners. Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of 
Cooperation141 demonstrated (admittedly in an artificially constructed computer 
tournament of iterated Prisoner Dilemma games) that a highly cooperative 
strategy ("tit for tat"-be nice and only retaliate when someone is bad to you, 
then quickly forgive) was robust and more successful than more competitive 
strategies. This work has led to applications in biology, politics, and law as 
researchers seek to understand how cooperative genes and cooperative behaviors 
have succeeded in a world posited to be governed principally by self-
interestedness. 142 As Robert Ellickson' s empirical study of cooperative neighbors 
in a remote California county demonstrated,143 social norms, in certain 
identifiable settings (such as with "iterated" long-term relationships or spatial 
proximity) may produce more coordinated and collaborative human interaction 
than the assumptions of a Hobbesian man-eat-man competitive Leviathan. So, 
138 BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
139 See generally MAx BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (4th 
ed. 1998); Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the 
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235 (1993); Lee Ross & Constance 
Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT. J. 389 (1991). 
140 See generally Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, 1 NEGOT. J. 9 (1985). 
141 AxELROD, supra note 22, at 14-28. 
142 See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); cf DONALD P. GREEN & 
IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPUCA TIONS IN 
POLmCAL SCIENCE (1994). 
143 ELLICKSON, supra note 49. 
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now even law and economics scholars are interested in understanding how social 
norms (or "informal" rules of social behavior) operate to both control and 
facilitate human interactions that somewhat de-centers law and focuses on 
informal and social processes that present "opportunities" as well as barriers for 
dispute and conflict resolution. l44 
The important legacy of this new body of work is to push us to seek 
explanations to understand under what conditions cooperation and coordination 
can emerge, and under what conditions the barriers to peaceful coexistence or 
resolution are more dominant. The field of international conflict resolution, for 
example, is a theoretical and empirical battleground for pessimistic barrier 
theorists145 and more optimistic opportunity seekers in dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 146 
VIll. CONCLUSION: LEGACIES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
The field of dispute resolution now demonstrates great intellectual 
eclecticism (some would say breadth), coupled with an almost necessary 
American pragmatism in its practice and constantly expanding application to new 
fields of human endeavor. It should be clear from this brief, and somewhat 
idiosyncratic, review of some of our founding concepts that dispute resolution 
lies at the center of an intersection of many disciplines and is a discipline and 
practice for which the term "applied science" might have been invented.147 It 
remains to be seen what new learning will inform the field and whether that 
learning will come predominantly from inside law, legal science, and legal 
institutions or, more likely, from without. To the extent that dispute resolution 
engages individuals in relation to each other, situated in piivate and public 
144 This "Johnny-come-lately" (if I may call it that) interest of the law and economics 
community in social interaction would greatly amuse many of our founding mothers and 
fathers, who argued for the primacy of social interactionist models of dispute resolution from 
the start. E.g., Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 171 
(Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971). 
145 E.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW 
NATIONAUSM (1993). 
146 E.g., WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY 
CONFLICT (Melanie C. Greenberg et al. eds., 2000). 
147 Indeed, scholars such as Howard Raiffa and Donald SchOn have both articulated 
and engaged in developing both the theory and applications of a variety of these contributing 
disciplines to the "applied" domains of dispute resolution, decision science, and policy 
formation. E.g., HAMMOND, supra note 23; DONALD SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME 
REfLECTION: TOWARD THE REsOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POUCY CONTROVERSIES (1994). 
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relationships, in varied configurations of institutions, we will take our knowledge 
from disciplines that focus on both individual and collective action. Thus, I hope 
to have illustrated the importance of continuing to remember the intellectual 
contributions of our founders from a diversity of fields, so that in paying 
attention to past insights (and meticulous empirical work) we will know to search 
widely and deeply for new ideas, explanations, and practices. 
So, what principles or teachings do we take away from the mothers and 
fathers of invention who founded our field, whether wittingly or not? From these 
intellectual founders, I take the following major precepts that have greatly 
informed the more modern classics in our new canon: 
1. Conflict can be good and a potential source of creativity. It is not always 
to be resolved or squelched. Conflict handled appropriately can put the parties 
(and the rest of us) in a better position than we were before or than we might be 
in if left to our own devices (or litigation). 
2. Good resolutions of conflicts and problems in the law can occur when 
people realize that valuing different things differently is good. Money need not 
be a proxy for everything, an assumption that can lead to bitter zero-sum games 
and distributive or unnecessary compromise outcomes. More issues and more 
trades enhance the likelihood of both the number and quality of possible 
resolutions. 
3. Different dispute resolution processes produce different kinds of 
outcomes. Where there is a need for a decision, with a reasoned and reported 
basis, adversarial argumentation may be more important to framing the 
resolution. Where there is more than one party or more than one issue 
("polycentric" disputes), however, single decision outcomes may not be wise, 
and mediation, or a negotiated consensus, rather than a single issue, externally 
imposed decision may be better. 
4. Settlements or mediated solutions do not have to be compromises or "split 
the difference" outcomes. By exploring different values and underlying interests, 
creative solutions and integrative outcomes may be possible. 
5. Institutionalized choices about processes facilitate an appropriate range of 
public and private participation in different kinds and levels of matters and may 
legitimate both individual cases and the larger legal and political system in which 
those cases are handled. Different dispute institutions will have their own special 
competencies, expertises, and morality for handling particular kinds of matters, 
which may change over time, developing a kind of "process integrity." 
6. Processes produce different kinds of outcomes-there are no universal 
processes that will always be better, fairer, or more efficient than others. Dispute 
processes are part of the larger culture in which they are embedded and also help 
create a community's sense of self. Different kinds of disputes will call for 
different kinds of "handling," "managing," or "resolution." 
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7. Variations and choices in processes used to resolve particular matters or 
to plan future arrangements or" transactions in a society are likely to increase 
participation in and legitimacy of the outcomes reached. . 
8. The human conditions under which peaceful collaboration and 
cooperation versus conflict and aggression exist are variable, and we continue to 
need more theory and more practice to 'elaborate when we" mortal actors can 
influence each other's behavior. 
In reviewing these contributions of our intellectual forbearers, a question 
comes to mind. Is there nothing new under the sun? Can every new insight about 
dispute processes be traced to some earlier theorist, scholar, or empiricist? I think 
the answer to that question is that humans and legal scholars (sometimes co-
extensive groups) do often "create" ideas without tracing their origins and 
considering what intellectual and social forces produce particular questions and 
answers at particular times. There may be no new questions to ask, but there are 
plenty of new situations and conditions against which to measure and re-consider 
pronouncements by earlier generations. In reviewing our mothers and fathers of 
invention in the field of dispute resolution, I am both awed by how much they 
have given us and challenged by how much has changed that requires new 
thinking on these old themes. 
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